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Federal Sentencing Error as Loss of Chance
In July 2010, a federal district court sentenced DeAngelo Whiteside to sev-
enteen years and six months in prison for a drug offense.
1 Under Fourth Cir-
cuit precedent, Mr. Whiteside's two prior state drug convictions triggered
application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' "career offender" enhance-
ment.' On the facts of Mr. Whiteside's case, the Guidelines recommended be-
tween twenty-one and twenty-eight years in prison.
3 The district court arrived
at its ultimate sentence after granting the government's motion for a shorter
sentence due to Mr. Whiteside's cooperation.4
If Mr. Whiteside had been sentenced just over a year later, he would not
have been a "career offender."' In 2011, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
Circuit had misinterpreted which state convictions qualify as "prior felony con-
1. See Whiteside v. United States, No. 1:o9-cr-ooo69-MR-1, 2013 WL 2317693, at *1
(W.D.N.C. May 28, 2013); Whiteside v. United States (Whiteside 1), 748 F.3d 541, 544 (4th
Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 775 F.3d 18o (4 th Cir.). Mr. Whiteside pled guilty
to possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). Id. at *1.
2. See United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2005), overruled by United States v.
Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011). Those age eighteen or above who are convicted of a
felony crime of violence or drug offense and who have a minimum of "two prior felony con-
victions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense" are designated "ca-
reer offenders" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL S 4B1.1(a) (2014). In the federal sentencing matrix, a career offender's criminal his-
tory category is automatically designated as Category VI, the highest level, and the offense
level is also subject to an enhancement. Id. § 4 B1.l(b).
3. Whiteside, 2013 WL 2317693 at *1.
4. See Whiteside 1, 748 F.3d at 544.
5. See Simmons, 649 F.3d at 247. For state convictions to qualify as prior felony convictions for
career offender purposes, they must be punishable by more than one year in prison; whether
the state designates the conviction as a felony is immaterial. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2014). Mr. Whiteside's two prior North Carolina drug convictions, for
possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and possession with intent to sell and de-
liver marijuana, qualified as prior felony convictions in the Fourth Circuit when he was ini-
tially sentenced. See Brief of Appellee at 8, Whiteside I, 748 F.3d 541 (No. 13-7152).
2663
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
victions" that trigger the career offender enhancement. 6 Under the proper in-
terpretation, Mr. Whiteside's prior offenses would not have warranted a
heightened recommended sentence.7 Instead, the Guidelines would have rec-
ommended a maximum prison term of roughly fourteen years and six
months.8 Assuming the same downward departure, Mr. Whiteside's sentence,
if determined today, would be nine years and four months-a difference of
about eight years of his life. 9
Federal courts are currently locked in a debate over what to do with sen-
tences like Mr. Whiteside's, in which the sentencing court misapplied'0 the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines' career offender enhancement." The core issue
in this debate is whether misapplication of the Guidelines may be challenged
post-conviction on collateral review. 2 In these cases, the sentencing court's ap-
plication of the legal standard for career offender status has been invalidated,
typically because the circuit's interpretation of a "prior felony conviction" has
changed. 3 The sentencing court's use of that legal standard is, in retrospect, an
erroneous application of law. 4 The question is whether such misapplications of
law are cognizable in a later challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255."'
6. See Simmons, 649 F.3d at 247.
7. Whiteside I, 748 F.3d at 551.
8. Brief of Appellant at S, Whiteside 1, 748 F.3 d 541 (No. 13-7152).
9. Whiteside 1, 748 F.3d at S44.
1o. Courts routinely refer to prior Guidelines misinterpretation as "erroneous application" or
"misapplication." See, e.g., Whiteside I, 748 F.3d at 546, 549.
ii. Compare Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3 d 820, 823-24 (7th Cir. 2013) (denying collateral
review), reh'g denied, 724 F.3d 915 (7th Cir.), and Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F. 3d 700,
705-06 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (same), with Spencer v. United States (Spencer 1), 727 F.3d
1076, 1o91 (iith Cir. 2013) (allowing collateral review), rev'd en banc, 773 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir.
2014), and Whiteside, 748 F.3d at SP (same).
12. For readers unfamiliar with post-conviction challenges, "collateral review" challenges are
those that occur in federal court after all direct appeals have been exhausted.
13. See, e.g., Hawkins, 7o6 F.3d at 822 (finding that the Supreme Court's holding that a walka-
way escape from prison is not a "violent felony" for career offender purposes meant that nei-
ther of Mr. Hawkins's predicate convictions were "prior felony convictions" qualifying him
for the career offender enhancement).
14. See, e.g., id.
is. Section 2255 is the primary post-conviction remedy for federal prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. 5
2255 (2012); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1157 (6th ed. 2009) (describing § 2255 as federal prison-
ers' principal means of post-conviction relief). The career offender cases raise additional
questions about the retroactive application of Guidelines changes in S 2255 proceedings. See,
e.g., Whiteside v. United States (Whiteside II), 775 F.3d i8o, 187 (4 th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(reversing the panel decision finding cognizability, on the grounds that equitable tolling of
the one-year deadline for a § 2255 challenge was inappropriate); Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 703-
04 (declining to reach whether application of a provision of the Guidelines that is later de-
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The test for cognizability in these cases is whether sentencing error consti-
tutes a "complete miscarriage of justice."' 6 If it does, then sentences like Mr.
Whiteside's can be challenged on collateral review; if it does not, these sen-
tences stand. Of the four circuits that have applied this test, the Seventh,
Eighth, and Eleventh have held that career offender misapplication is not a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. 7 The First Circuit recently found a career
offender claim cognizable on its facts but declined to consider whether sentenc-
ing errors arising from a change in legal interpretation give rise to a § 2255 chal-
lenge.'8 In Whiteside, after a Fourth Circuit panel held that the error amounted
to a fundamental miscarriage of justice, an en banc court reversed on the
grounds that Mr. Whiteside's appeal was untimely. 9 All of these decisions, ex-
cept the First Circuit's, hinged on a single vote.2' Two were en banc.2"
This Comment argues that courts have taken the wrong approach to cog-
nizability. Circuit court opinions, and scholarly analysis of these opinions, have
framed the argument over misapplication of the career offender enhancement
as a conflict between individual fairness -the righting of a wrong by the legal
system to an erroneously sentenced individual - and finality- the criminal jus-
tice system's interest in leaving final sentences undisturbed.' This Comment
termined to be erroneous is a "new substantive rule[]" for collateral review purposes). These
questions are beyond the scope of this Comment.
16. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). Addonizio requires, for 5 2255 cognizability, that the error have been "a
fundamental defect which inherently result[ed] in a complete miscarriage of justice." Id.
Courts frequently characterize the standard as "a fundamental miscarriage of justice." See,
e.g., Phillips v. United States, 734 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. McGaughy,
670 F.3d 1149, 1159 (loth Cir. 2012).
17. Spencer v. United States (Spencer II), 773 F. 3d 1132 (ith Cir. 2014) (en banc); Hawkins, 706
F.3 d at 823-24; Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705-06.
1S. Cuevas v. United States, No. 14-1296, 2015 WL 545132, at *4 (1st Cir. Feb. 11, 2015). The
Cuevas court limited its decision to the particularly "exceptional" facts: post-sentencing, the
state had vacated Cuevas's prior felony drug convictions qualifying him for the career of-
fender enhancement after discovering systematic falsification of drug sample tests at a state
laboratory. Id. at *1, *4.
19. Whiteside I, 748 F.3d 541, 547 (4 th Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 775 F.3d 18o (4 th
Cir.).
20. Spencer 1I, 773 F.3 d at 1132; Whiteside 1, 748 F.3d at 541; Hawkins, 706 F.3 d at 820; Sun Bear,
644 F. 3d at 700.
21. Spencer II, 773 F.3d at 1132; Sun Bear, 644 F. 3 d at 700.
22. For academic commentary on collateral challenges to the career offender enhancement, see,
for example, Brandon L. Garrett, Accuracy in Sentencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 499, 535, 542-43
(2014) (arguing for "flexible" resentencing because "convicts should not serve added time
based on errors" and because finality considerations do not "play the same role" in the sen-
tencing context); Sarah French Russell, Reluctance To Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Col-
lateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 104-15, 16o-63 (2012) (arguing that individual and societal
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contends that disagreement over the cognizability of these claims is actually
about the nature of the harm in sentencing error. What federal courts are ask-
ing, in effect, is whether the lost probability of a lower sentence is itself a cog-
nizable injury. Despite the prevalence of language about "probability" and
"risk" in the career offender opinions,23 courts rarely articulate the sentencing
debate in these terms. This Comment focuses on the latent probability analysis
in sentencing opinions. It argues that a new approach to cognizability-one
characterized in terms of probability -would better address the harm at stake
in sentencing.
The Comment proceeds in two Parts. Part I draws on an analogy to tort
law to argue that sentencing debates are, at their core, about loss of chance.
This Part highlights the role that probability plays in recent sentencing opin-
ions. It argues that, as an empirical matter, loss of chance is an accurate way to
describe sentencing error given the "anchoring effect" of the Guidelines on sen-
tencing practices.
Part II makes the structural case for conceptualizing Guidelines sentencing
error as a problem of probability. This Part argues that failure to recognize the
probability dispute has obscured important debates about the continued vitali-
ty of the Guidelines system. After United States v. Booker, the Sentencing
Guidelines are advisory in principle and influential in practice.' Part II argues
that treating Guidelines error as loss of chance -a loss that can constitute a
fundamental miscarriage of justice in the career offender context -is necessary
in order to enforce a Guidelines regime that is neither too rigid nor wholly in-
determinate. The Comment concludes that a loss of chance framework can help
address core concerns in federal sentencing law.
interests in promoting justice outweigh finality interests and therefore favor collateral re-
view of sentencing error, including in the career offender context); Julie Austin, Note, Clos-
ing a Resentencing Loophole: A Proposal To Amend 28 U.S.C. 5 2255, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 909,
944 (2oo6) (proposing limiting collateral challenges to prior convictions underlying a career
offender determination, to further "efficiency and the finality of judgments").
23. See, e.g., Whiteside I, 748 F. 3d at 551 (drawing on the Supreme Court's observation that a
higher Guidelines calculation leads to a "significant risk of a higher sentence" (quoting
Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2o88 (2013)); Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 831 (Rovner, J.,
dissenting) (describing the "high probability of... a much longer sentence" due to the er-
roneous application of the career offender enhancement).
24. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005) (invalidating the portions of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Act making the Sentencing Guidelines mandatory); infra notes 32-36 and
accompanying text (discussing Booker's effect).
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I. THE PROBABILITY DEBATE
In appellate court opinions on career offender misapplication, judges have
framed the debate over sentencing error in terms of fairness and finality.' Cir-
cuit courts that have held career offender misapplication not cognizable have
emphasized the need for finality in order to minimize systemic burdens on the
justice system. 6 In contrast, courts that have held sentencing error cognizable
have stressed fairness to individual defendants.27 The Fourth Circuit, for ex-
ample, characterized its holding that career offender error is a fundamental
miscarriage of justice as a determination that finality should not "outweigh the
plain injustice" of precluding post-conviction review. In holding career of-
fender error non-cognizable, the Seventh Circuit majority faulted the dissent
for failing to recognize "the difficulty of balancing 'fairness' (meaning what ex-
actly?) against finality."29 The Eleventh and Eighth Circuit opinions" and aca-
demic discussion3 feature similar language.
This line of discourse has obscured the significance of the advisory Guide-
lines sentencing regime to these cases. In 2005, United States v. Booker invali-
dated the provisions of the Federal Sentencing Act making the Sentencing
Guidelines mandatory.3" Now, though federal courts still determine the rec-
ommended Guidelines sentence, that determination is not binding. The shift
to an advisory regime leaves the Guidelines' juridical status unclear. The Su-
2s. The fairness-finality debate is a familiar one in sentencing discussions. See, e.g., Douglas A.
Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
POL'Y 151 (2014); Ron Marmer, Error, Finality, and Fairness: Have We Got It Wrong?, 38 LIT-
IGATION 4 (2012).
26. See Spencer I1, 773 F.3d at 1144 (citing deterrence and a certainty described as necessary to
make law's "commands" "effective" as the reasons for valuing finality); Hawkins, 7o6 F.3d at
823-24. The Eighth Circuit opinion does not evince the same level of concern for finality,
though the dissenting judges criticized the majority for valuing finality over substantive jus-
tice. See Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 707 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
27. Whiteside I, 748 F.3 d at 553; Spencer I, 727 F. 3d 1076, 1090 (11th Cir. 2013), rev'd en banc, 773
F.3d 1132 (11th Cir.).
an. Whiteside I, 748 F.3d at 554.
29. Hawkins v. United States, 724 F. 3d 915, 918 (7 th Cit. 2013) (denying rehearing).
30. See Spencer 1, 727 F. 3d at 1090 (recognizing "the perennial concern about the justice system's
need for finality"); Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 707 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majori-
ty for "promot[ing] finality at the expense of justice").
31. See Gregory S. Dierdorf, Comment, Yes, We Were Wrong; No, We Will Not Make It Right:
The Seventh Circuit Denies Post-Conviction Relieffrom an Undisputed Sentencing Error Because
It Occurred in the Post-Booker, Advisory Guidelines Era, 9 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 301 (2014)
(arguing that legal developments have tipped the balance to fairness over finality).
32. 543 U.S. 220, 258-59 (2005).
2667
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
preme Court has called the advisory Guidelines the "lodestone"3 and "the
starting point and initial benchmark " 34 of federal courts' sentencing.3" Yet
Booker describes the Guidelines as "merely advisory," and the significance of an
"advisory" system is hotly contested.36 Ultimately, disagreement over career
offender resentencing is about the meaning of the post-Booker Guidelines: is
the probability of a higher sentence due to Guidelines error a harm of its own?
Circuit court opinions on sentencing error do not treat the probabilistic
question inherent in these cases in a systematic way; they do not even use the
phrase "loss of chance." 37 But the valuative and the empirical questions running
through the career offender debate are the essential questions of probabilistic
analysis: whether Guidelines error represents a lost opportunity for a better
outcome and the value of that loss to the person harmed. Courts disagree about
whether missing out on the chance of a lower sentence can ever be a funda-
mental miscarriage of justice.
A. Chance as Value
When cast in these terms, the sentencing misapplication argument raises
issues analogous to those implicated by the loss of chance approach in tort law.
In medical malpractice cases, many jurisdictions use the loss of chance ap-
proach.38 The idea underlying this doctrine is that the opportunity for a better
outcome itself has value, such that deprivation of that chance may be a legally
actionable harm.39 Sentencing error debates can be understood along similar
lines. Judges who argue that career offender misapplication may be a funda-
mental miscarriage of justice see the chance of a lower sentence as a harm in it-
33. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (2013).
3. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
35. Using a forty-three-level Sentencing Table, a federal probation officer generates a sentenc-
ing range for an offense based on the individual's criminal history and the nature of the
crime. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 iBI.1 (2014); id. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory
cmt. The court then "make[s] an individualized assessment based on the facts presented" to
determine the offender's sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Throughout sentencing, the court
must "remain cognizant of" the Guidelines range. Id. at 5o n.6.
36. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233; see infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2013).
38. See Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W. 2d 321, 329 (Minn. 2013) (citing DAN B.
DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS § 196 (2d ed. 2011)) (describing widespread application
of loss of chance doctrine).
39. See id.; Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involv-
ing Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1354 (1981) (outlining
the loss of chance doctrine).
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self.4" Those who reject cognizability do not view the probability of a different
sentence as a harm requiring review because, even with a different Guideline
recommendation, the judge may re-sentence the offender to the same term. 4'
In the medical malpractice context, loss of chance typically involves a two-
step, proportional recovery analysis.' In the first step, the injury is conceptual-
ized as the loss of an opportunity for a better outcome.43 This characterization
enables the plaintiff to recover when she cannot demonstrate preponderance-
of-the-evidence causation of the ultimate injury but can show that it is more
likely than not that the harm caused a diminished likelihood of a positive out-
come.' Imagine, for example, that a person who died of cancer initially had a
forty-percent chance of recovery, but that her physician's negligence decreased
her chances to twenty-five percent. This person's estate could not prove that
the physician's negligence caused her death.4" But a loss of chance framework
would cast the fifteen-percentage-point diminution in the possibility of recov-
40. See, e.g., Whiteside 1, 748 F.3 d 541, 554-55 (4 th Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 775 F. 3d i8o (4 th
Cir.).
41. See, e.g., Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 825; Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 705-o6 (8th Cir.
2011) (en banc).
42. Some jurisdictions use a "relaxed causation" approach to loss of chance, in which the plain-
tiff may recover the total amount in damages despite failing to meet the typical preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence burden of proof. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc.,
688 P.2d 605, 6o8 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that a jury may find for plaintiff so long as it
"find[s] a probability that defendant's negligence was a cause of plaintiffs injury"). Unlike
proportional recovery, relaxed causation does not take into account the value of the chance
in determining the ultimate recovery; once the jury finds causation, a plaintiff recovers one
hundred percent of the damages resulting from the worse outcome. See Thompson, 688 P.2d
at 6o6-08; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 38, 5 196. Proportional recovery is the dominant ap-
proach. See Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 335; see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 38, § 196 (describ-
ing an increase in the number of states adopting proportional recovery). Proportional recov-
ery is also preferable for sentencing error because, unlike relaxed causation, it assigns weight
in the analysis to both the magnitude and the likelihood of harm. See infra note 6z and ac-
companying text.
43. See Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 334 (describing the "chance to survive or achieve a more favora-
ble medical outcome as something of value"); Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 832
(Mass. 2008) ("When a physician's negligence diminishes or destroys a patient's chance of
survival, the patient has suffered real injury. The patient has lost something of great value: a
chance to survive, to be cured, or otherwise to achieve a more favorable medical outcome.");
King, supra note 39, at 1354 (explaining that "the loss of a chance of achieving a favorable
outcome.., should be valued appropriately").
44. Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 337; Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 832.
45. Mandros v. Prescod, 948 A.2d 304, 310 (R.I. 2008); Gardner v. Pawliw, 696 A.2d 599, 6o8
(N.J. 1997); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W. 2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986).
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ery as a legally cognizable harm.4 6 The loss of chance doctrine thus allows
plaintiffs to recover where they otherwise might not.
Judges and scholars also use probabilistic reasoning in non-medical con-
texts. The Seventh Circuit applies a loss of chance approach to damages in em-
ployment discrimination cases. 47 When a fire department violated § 1983 and
Title VII by maintaining racial quotas in promotions, the Seventh Circuit ex-
plained that the harm at issue was the lost chance of promotion for white ap-
plicants. 4s The Seventh Circuit required that the jury award damages equal to
the product of the total lost benefits and the percentage chance of promotion in
order to compensate for the lost opportunity. 49 Standing doctrine is another
area in which probabilistic reasoning has begun to take hold. As Justice Breyer
has emphasized, "courts have often found probabilistic injuries sufficient to
support standing.""s Commentators have suggested that the loss of chance
doctrine best explains the existence of "actual or imminent injury" for standing
in cases finding probabilistic harm, such as cases in which applicants challenge
university programs' admissions policies."1
The role of probabilistic reasoning has not yet been recognized in the sen-
tencing context.5 2 This is a mistake given the centrality of probability in sen-
46. See McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 477 (Okla. 1987) (using these num-
bers as an example and determining that the damages are fifteen percent of the total damag-
es for wrongful death).
47. Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F. 3 d 68o, 688-89 (7 th Cir. 2004); see also Doll v. Brown, 75
F.3d 1200, 1205-07 (7th Cir. 1996) (proposing the use of loss of chance in the Title VII em-
ployment discrimination damages context for the first time).
48. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 688.
49. Id.
so. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 116o-2 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
probabilistic language from at least twelve prior Supreme Court cases finding that the prob-
ability of injury sufficed for standing). The majority disagreed with Justice Breyer's analysis
of probability's significance to standing. See id. at 1148 (majority opinion) ("[A] highly at-
tenuated chain of possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury
must be certainly impending.").
51. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432,
1465 (1988) (arguing that a probabilistic theory of injury best explains standing for the ap-
plicant challenging the University of California at Davis's admissions policies in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)); see also Jonathan Remy Nash,
Standing's Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1288 (2013) (arguing for conceiving of
standing through the lens of the expected value of harm). In such cases, of course, the appli-
cant does not know for certain whether the admissions outcome would have been different
had the program's policy been more favorable to the applicant.
52. For a nod to the significance of loss of chance to post-conviction sentencing challenges, see
Ryan C. Thomas, Comment, Not-So-Harmless Error: A Higher Standard for Mitigation Errors
on Capital Habeas Review, 89 WASH. L. REv. 515, 548-49 n.298 (2014). One commentator ar-
gues for a more-likely-than-not miscarriage of justice standard for cognizability of post-
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tencing error cases. In misapplication cases, a major-if only implicit-point of
disagreement is whether to conceptualize the harm in sentencing error as the
lost probability of a different sentence.5 3 Opinions holding career offender er-
rors cognizable borrow the valuative terms of loss of chance doctrine. For ex-
ample, the Fourth Circuit has argued that the "chance to be sentenced accord-
ing to the factors that everyone agrees should apply" is significant in itself.'
These opinions have tended to acknowledge that a new sentence could be the
same as the first, since both would be within the permissible statutory range,




Other courts argue that, post-Booker, a sentence within the statutory
bounds can never be a fundamental miscarriage of justice because that sentence
is lawful and could be imposed again. s6 The fact that a judge could order the
same sentence, even under the new interpretation, means that the sentence
must be just, no matter what the odds are that a judge would order a different
conviction challenges to sentencing error, including misapplications of the career offender
enhancement: under such a standard, § 2255 relief would be available if "a reasonable judge
would 'more likely than not' adopt a different sentence." See Garrett, supra note 22, at 528,
533-34. The lost-chance approach outlined in this Comment is preferable to a more-likely-
than-not standard, because it better combats the legitimacy deficit by taking into account
the magnitude of the harm as well as the probability of a different sentence. Under lost
chance, unlike the more-likely-than-not approach, a fifteen-year difference in recommended
sentence, for example, may be a fundamental miscarriage of justice even if the offender's
original chance of obtaining that lower sentence was forty-nine rather than fifty-one per-
cent.
S3. Sentencing error itself is analogous to a tort, as it is the breach of a judge's duty to sentence
according to the law, leading to injury. This line of analysis does not open floodgates of tort
litigation given, inter alia, the absolute immunity for federal officials exercising the judicial
function. See FALLON,JR. ETAL., supra note 15, at 995.
s4. Whiteside I, 748 F.3d 541, 554-55 (4th Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 775 F.3d 18o (4th Cir.).
SS. This emphasis on the probability of a new sentence is grounded in these opinions' percep-
tion that the Guidelines do affect sentencing. Compare Whiteside I, 748 F.3d at 553, and Sun
Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 711 (8th Cir. 2011) (Melloy, J., dissenting), with Haw-
kins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (charac-
terizing the likelihood of receiving the same sentence without a career offender enhancement
added to the Guidelines calculation as "no chance"). The strong empirical basis for this per-
ception is discussed infra notes 63-65 and 76-81 and accompanying text.
56. See Spencer II, 773 F.3d 1132, 1140 (ilth Cir. 2013) (en banc) ("Even if he is not a career of-
fender, his sentence is lawful."); id. at 1142 ("The greater impact of one [sentencing] en-
hancement versus the lesser impact of another enhancement is immaterial because [both
are] within the statutory limits imposed by Congress."); Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 825 (noting
the possibility of an "identical sentence" on resentencing); Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705 (em-
phasizing that "the same .. . sentence could be reimposed" even without the career offender
enhancement).
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sentence.17 These opinions do not view the lost chance of a lower sentence as an
inherent harm. In arguing over the relative value of the probability of a lower
sentence, these sets of opinions are actually, although they do not explicitly
recognize it, arguing for and against conceiving of the harm from Guidelines
sentencing error as loss of chance.
B. Anchoring Effects
The second step in loss of chance analysis starts from an empirical ques-
tion: what is the value of the lost chance? In the medical malpractice context,
the most common approach to this question is the proportional recovery rule,
which values the lost chance as a compensable injury.s Under this approach,
the plaintiff's decreased probability of a positive outcome is multiplied by the
damages in the worse outcome in order to arrive at a final damages determina-
tion."9 This step incorporates a factual determination about the medical profes-
sional's negligence into loss of chance analysis. If the decreased chance for a
better outcome is de minimis, then there is no possibility of recovery.6o
Debates over sentencing involve a similar empirical question about the ex-
tent to which the Guidelines influence judges. In tort law, the loss of chance
question is how much a physician's negligence lowered the probability of a dif-
ferent outcome. The parallel question for sentencing error is how much the er-
roneous Guidelines range affected the original sentence .6, If the Guidelines er-
ror lowered the chance of a different sentence, that decreased chance, together
with the longer sentence, may make the harm a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.62
57. See Whiteside I, 748 F.3d at 570 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) ("How is it that requiring some-
one to serve a sentence lawfully imposed ... becomes a 'plain injustice' and a 'fundamental
unfairness'?") (quoting Whiteside I, 748 F.3d at 554 (majority opinion)).
58. See, e.g., Dickhoffex rel. Dickhoffv. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 335 (Minn. 2013) (justifying the
proportional-recovery approach as the "most equitable method of apportioning damages
consistent with the degree of fault"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABITY FOR PHYS-
ICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (2oo).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LiABIuTY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt.
n.
6o. See Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 334 n.13.
61. A starting point for determining the Guidelines' effect in a particular context is the
Sentencing Commission's statistical data, which provides data on sentences within
and without Guidelines range by offense category and guideline. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 2013 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2013), http://www.ussc
.gov/research-and-publications/annual-reports-sourcebooks/2o 3/sourcebook-2o 13 [http://
perma.cc/TY5W-GZ2E].
6z. To represent the doctrine mathematically, in tort: (damages for entire loss) x (chance of a
different outcome) = (damages awarded). In the sentencing context, the equation would be:
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There is reason to believe that the Guidelines do affect outcomes. In a heu-
ristic pattern first identified by psychologists of judgment and decision-making
in the 1970s, an initial quantitative starting point, or a suggested "anchoring"
value, affects a final judgment by establishing a presumptive baseline.
6
' The
final determination or estimate will be closer to the anchoring value. Altering
the initial anchoring value thus changes the final estimate. Social science re-
search suggests that the Guidelines may in fact have such an "anchoring ef-
fect." 6' The Supreme Court has identified such anchoring as the purpose of the
Guidelines.6 s
Courts construing sentencing error as a fundamental miscarriage of justice
tend to emphasize the Guidelines' impact on judges' decision-making.
66 Using
empirical evidence 67 and sentencing judges' accounts of how they arrived at
their decisions,68 judges stress that the Guidelines are the basis from which
sentencing begins. In its since-overturned panel opinion holding the career of-
fender enhancement cognizable, for example, the Eleventh Circuit highlighted
Sentencing Commission data indicating that eighty percent of sentences fall
within the Guidelines range or result from government motions for a down-
(magnitude of harm, which is time added to recommended sentence by Guidelines error) x
(percentage chance of a different sentence) = (harm). If the harm in sentencing error is high
enough, it constitutes a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Determining the point at which
a sentencing error crosses the fundamental miscarriage of justice threshold is up to judges,
who could create bright-line rules based on the mathematical formula or take a case-by-case
approach.
63. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974) (identifying the anchoring heuristic and documenting its effect
on estimates of the percentage of African countries that are United Nations members);
Timothy D. Wilson et al., A New Look at Anchoring Effects: Basic Anchoring and Its Anteced-
ents, 125 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 387, 399 (1996) (determining "that completely arbitrary
numbers can anchor people's judgments").
64. See Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive "Anchoring Effect" and "Blind Spot" Biases in Fed-
eral Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 489, 511 (2014); Daniel M. Isaacs, Note, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 YALE
L.J. 426, 439-443 (2011).
65. See Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2o83 (2013) (describing advisory Guidelines sen-
tencing as "aim[ing] to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are an-
chored by the Guidelines").
66. See, e.g., Whiteside 1, 748 F.3d 541, 550-51 (4th Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 775 F.3d 18o (4th
Cir.); Spencer I, 727 F.3d 1076, lo88 (lith Cir. 2013), rev'd en banc, 773 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir.).
67. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915, 920 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing) ("[E]mpirical evidence supports the view that the Sentencing
Guidelines greatly influence the sentences imposed by judges.").
68. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 7o6 F.3d 820, 831 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting)
(suggesting, as well, that the sentencing judge may have held an "forbidden presumption"
in favor of the Guidelines).
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ward departure. 69 The Eleventh Circuit panel also cited the sentencing judge's
statement that the career offender enhancement had "essentially doubled" the
offender's sentence. 70
The converse view, expressed in opinions failing to find a fundamental
miscarriage of justice, is that the Guidelines are "less serious" after Booker.7'
This view takes at face value the idea that judges will apply the steps of Guide-
lines doctrinal analysis mandated by the Supreme Court. Opinions based on
this belief emphasize that the sentencing process requires that the Guidelines
"not even be presumed reasonable"' and that the judge "make an independent
determination. '73 The Seventh Circuit, for instance, concluded that, "calculat-
ing the guidelines range correctly.., is less important now.... ."' These opin-
ions dispute the empirical significance of the Guidelines' anchoring effect, ar-
guing that in the career offender context the offender's prior crimes
independently explain why he or she received a higher sentence.75
Empirical evidence indicates that the latter approach is inaccurate. 76 Studies
have documented the anchoring effect's impact on judges,7 including in crimi-
nal sentencing, even when judges determine the starting point for a criminal
sentence by rolling dice and know that their baseline is completely random. s
In the aggregate, sentencing data suggest that the anchoring effect is borne
out: 51.2% of all fiscal year 2013 sentences were within Guidelines range, and
27.9% were within the range of government-sponsored downward depar-
69. Spencer 1, 727 F. 3d at 1O87-88, 1O89.
70. Id.
71. Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824; see also Spencer II, 773 F.3d 1132, 1142 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(declining, "[i]n this post-Booker world," to find that Guidelines miscalculation may ever be
a fundamental miscarriage of justice); Whiteside I, 748 F.3d at 560 (Wilkinson, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Hawkins and adding that Guidelines influence is insufficient "to activate col-
lateral review").
72. Whiteside I, 748 F. 3d at 560 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
73. Hawkins, 706 F.3 d at 822-23.
74. Id. at 822.
7s. Id. at 825. Hawkins also uses broader Sentencing Commission evidence, without taking
downward departures into account, to find the Guidelines not highly influential. Id. at 824.
76. In fact, the Supreme Court has identified the anchoring effect as the purpose of the Guide-
lines, as noted supra text accompanying note 65. See also Bennett, supra note 64, at 523 ("It is
hardly surprising that the United States Sentencing Guidelines still act as a hulking anchor
for most judges.").
77. E.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside theJudicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 791-92 (2001) (in
an experimental setting, finding a statistically significant difference in judges' damages
awards to plaintiffs depending on whether or not the judges had heard a motion to dismiss
for failure to meet the federal diversity amount-in-controversy requirement of $75,ooo).
78. Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on
Experts'Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 197 (2006).
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tures.79 In other words, only 20.9% of all fiscal year 2013 sentences fell outside
of Guidelines- or government-sponsorship-based determinations.s For career
offenders in fiscal year 2012, roughly 30% of sentences fell within Guidelines
range, while 41.1% of sentences were government-sponsored below-range sen-
tences.81
The anchoring effect suggests that the Guidelines have a strong influence
on offenders' ultimate sentences, making it likely, although not certain, that an
individual would have had a different sentence if the initial benchmark were
different. Because the Guidelines still affect judges in practice, the defendant's
loss of chance in cases of sentencing error is real. In the career offender context,
the likelihood that misapplied Guidelines affected the outcome- and the years
at stake in that error -weigh in favor of cognizability.
8'
II. THE ADVISORY GUIDELINES SYSTEM'S CONTINUED LEGITIMACY
Characterizing sentencing error as loss of chance captures the empirical re-
ality that Guidelines errors make a harsher sentence more probable. Structural
concerns also support a loss of chance framework. The post-Booker Guidelines
run two risks. First, the fact that the regime is discretionary in principle but an-
choring in fact may create a legitimacy deficit. Second, such a regime threatens
to upset the delicate balance that the Guidelines have struck between indeter-
minacy and rigidity in criminal sentencing. Recognizing Guidelines error as in-
jury due to loss of chance -and significant error in the career offender context
as a fundamental miscarriage of justice-is necessary in order to avert these
problems and reinforce the advisory Guidelines regime.
The loss of chance framework can help to avoid what procedural justice
theory terms a "legitimacy deficit."8" Drawing on social psychology, procedural
justice scholars have identified the perception that a legal authority's decision-




81. Quick Facts: Career Offenders, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION (2012), http://www
.ussc.gov/sites/defaut/files/pdf/research-and-pubications/quick-facts/uick-Facts-Career
_Offender.pdf [http://perma.cc/JF4Q-QSMT].
82. The loss of chance approach does not reject the fairness-finality debate. Rather, this frame-
work highlights the institutional importance of the potential for resentencing and redefines
the nature of the harm of sentencing error. Between fairness and finality, a loss of chance
approach supports the individual fairness rationale.
83. See Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to
Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 133 (2013) (citing DAVID
BEETHAm, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 22 (1991)).
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making procedures are fair as a reason that people view the criminal justice sys-
tem as an authoritative set of rules that they ought to obey.84 According to this
line of reasoning, procedural transparency and consistency promote the rule of
law. As Sarah French Russell points out, a systemic failure to "correct clear in-
justices that are easy to fix" undermines the current United States sentencing
regime's legitimacy."'
The legitimacy problem is particularly acute in the context of Guidelines
misapplication. Tom Tyler has identified both the "quality of decision making"
and the "understandability of actions" as "antecedents of procedural justice"
that heighten people's beliefs in the legitimacy of the legal system and actually
reinforce its legitimacy.86 Perceptions of both of these characteristics are at
stake in the cognizability of sentencing error. Intuitively, people often feel that
the lost chance of a better outcome is itself an injury.8 ' The federal sentencing
system's failure to recognize this harm as significant may challenge perceptions
of the quality of sentencing, particularly in light of the effects of anchoring bi-
as. The perception that the resentencing system is arbitrary, or that it is func-
84. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME &
JUST. 283, 286 (2003); see also Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: Introduction, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 123, 124 (2008) ("The modem crisis of legitimacy in American criminal
justice spans.., concerns about procedural fairness and respectful treatment that recognizes
citizen rights and treats people with dignity... ."); Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal
Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE L.J. 2236, 2272 (2014) (describing legitimacy as "self-
reinforcing" in terms of "compliance, deference, and cooperation").
85. Russell, supra note 22, at 87.
86. Tyler, supra note 84, at 299-300.
87. Loss of chance recognizes this intuition in the medical malpractice context. See supra notes
43-46 and accompanying text.
88. These problems are likely particularly pronounced due to the racial disparity in career of-
fender sentencing -individuals sentenced under career offender Guidelines calculations are
disproportionately African-American. Quick Facts: Career Offenders, supra note 81. In fiscal
year 2012, 61.9% of those designated career offenders were African-American, 20.1% were
white, 16.3% were Latino, and 1.8% were of another race or ethnicity. Id. By comparison, in
fiscal year 2013, 20.6% of all federal offenders were African-American, 23.8% were
white, 5i5% were Latino, and 4.1% were another race or ethnicity. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, supra note 61, at tbl. 4 , http://www.ussc.gov/sites/defaul/files/pdf/research-and
-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2o13iTableo 4 .pdf [http://perma.cc/Q 9 KH
-7ZEY]. Career offender error therefore runs a particular risk of deepening an existing legit-
imacy deficit in African-American communities: African-Americans are more likely to report
that a received outcome in the justice system was not deserved and to evaluate legal authori-
ties less positively than are other racial and ethnic groups. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J.
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tioning in a less discretionary manner than Booker suggests, risks undermining
the legitimacy of post-Booker sentencing.8 9
The loss of chance framework also reinforces the Guidelines' significance in
the eyes of judges. For the past half-century, American sentencing has strug-
gled with problems of both indeterminacy and rigidity.
9° Sentencing reforms
have vacillated between efforts to make the system more flexible, on one hand,
and more predictable on the other.9 ' The paradox of the advisory Guidelines
system is that it is both flexible and rigid: the Guidelines draw their power
simultaneously from judges' awareness of their advisory nature and from their
anchoring effects on judicial decision-making. The current advisory Guidelines
system strikes a balance between the harshness of mandatory Guidelines
92 and
the pre-1984 indeterminate federal sentencing regime, which created disparities
in sentences that implicated issues of bias against minorities.
93
This careful balance rests on judges' continued recognition that the Guide-
lines are meaningful. If judges begin to perceive the "merely advisory" Guide-
lines as having little persuasive power, then the sentencing system may revert
to pre-Guidelines indeterminacy.94 However, if judges fail to appreciate the
Guidelines' actual power, then judges may become less sensitive to miscalcula-
tion and less willing to confront the inequities that are systemically built into
the Guidelines.9" Extensive scholarship on the anchoring effect suggests that
89. Whether such perceptions of arbitrariness currently exist would be a fruitful avenue for fur-
ther research.
go. See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative His-
tory of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223 (1993) (narrating the
arc from indeterminate sentencing in the 1970s to rigid application of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines in the early 199os).
91. Id.
92. See Paul J. Hofer, Beyond the "Heartland": Sentencing Under the Advisory Federal Guidelines, 49
DuqL. REv. 675, 681 (2011) (characterizing the pre-Booker Guidelines regime as "creat[ing]
structural disparity" due to "rigid compliance," particularly in ways that created higher aver-
age sentences for African-Americans).
93. The Sentencing Commission and its promulgated Guidelines are the product of an attempt
by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to create greater uniformity in federal sentencing. See
Russell, supra note 22, at 9o (explaining that "concerns about unwarranted disparities in
sentences" led to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984); Stith & Koh, supra note 9o, at 227-28
(describing criticisms of 1970s indeterminate sentencing).
94. But see Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 137, 137-38 (20o6), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/foruni/what-yogi-berra
-teaches-about-post-booker-sentencing [http://perma.cc/Z5K3-AV6V] (asserting that sen-
tencing will not revert to indeterminacy under the Guidelines). Given the Supreme Court's
multiple post-Booker affirmances that the Guidelines remain the "touchstone" for sentenc-
ing, this outcome seems especially unlikely. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
9. The most notable inequity in federal sentencing is the eighteen-to-one sentencing disparity
for offenses involving crack versus powder cocaine. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L.
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the greatest threat to the post-Booker system is judges' underestimation of the
Guidelines' effect on their own sentencing practices. q6 When judges believe the
Guidelines have no real force, they may fail to appreciate the subtle but real ef-
fect the Guidelines have in creating a baseline for their sentencing determina-
tions. The loss of chance framework corrects for this error by signaling to judg-
es that the Guidelines continue to have practical significance and by requiring
judges to think carefully about the effect of Guidelines error in particular cases.
Ultimately, the failure to recognize that significant Guidelines error can be
a fundamental miscarriage of justice-because it represents a loss of chance-
risks devaluing the Guidelines in the eyes ofjudges.97 In order for the Guidelines
to continue to function as a compromise between indeterminacy and rigidity,
courts must act in accordance with the principle that the Guidelines matter.
Framing the harm at stake in sentencing as a loss of chance of a lower sentence
encourages such an approach. The loss of chance analogy, borrowed from tort
law and familiar from other probabilistic reasoning in law, can help to main-
tain the integrity of the current Guidelines regime.
CONCLUSION
Framing sentencing error as loss of chance highlights an institutional val-
ue: the continued vitality of the advisory Guidelines regime. Underlying sen-
tencing miscalculation cases is a larger post-Booker debate about the signifi-
cance and structure of non-mandatory Guidelines. 9s While scholars continue
to debate whether the post-Booker system is an improvement, the advisory
structure is here to stay. Booker unraveled the mandatory sentencing regime,99
and a return to an indeterminate sentencing system seems not only undesirable
No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Dorsey v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (2012) (describing the Fair Sentencing Act as changing
the disparity between crack and powder offenses in federal sentencing to eighteen-to-one).
Other inequities include the career offender enhancement's particularly harsh treatment of
prior drug offenses and the benefits that accrue to the first defendant who provides infor-
mation to the prosecutor. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 16o U. PA. L.
REV. 1631, 1683 nn.282 & 284 (2012).
96. See Gertner, supra note 94, at 137 (pointing out that "announcing that the Guidelines are
advisory does not make them so").
97. Cf id.
98. See generally Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 96 (defending the post-Booker system and ar-
guing against proposed "fixes"); see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme
Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L.
REv. 367, 461 (2010) (criticizing post-Booker sentencing as "obviously neither simple nor...
logical").
99. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 248-49 (2005).
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but also unlikely.'00 The pressing question, then, is how best to cognize errors
within the regime we have.
Academic commentary praising the advisory Guidelines system highlights
its flexibility"' and its potential to make judges more cognizant of their choic-
es." °2 Because the Guidelines gain their force from their anchoring effect on
judges,' 3 sentencing doctrines should recognize the Guidelines' impact on the
probability of a certain sentence. Guidelines errors of serious magnitude, like
the career offender enhancement, should be understood as fundamental mis-
carriages of justice so that judges and other actors in the criminal justice system
continue to place serious weight on the Guidelines. 10 4 In a post-Booker world,
the least desirable outcome would be a sentencing regime in which sentencing
guidelines are considered insignificant05 but continue to have a major effect on
sentencing. °6 Such a system would combine the worst aspects of sentencing:
the potential for indeterminacy and a lack of transparent reason.
Characterizing sentencing error as loss of chance averts this outcome. This
framework explicitly recognizes the reality of the Guidelines' impact on sen-
tencing. It also acknowledges that when, for instance, nine years of a person's
life are at stake, the likely effect of an error in Guidelines calculation is a fun-
damental miscarriage of justice. In order to maintain the continued relevance of
the Guidelines, courts should recognize that the baseline norm affects probabil-
ities in a case like DeAngelo Whiteside's. For Mr. Whiteside, and for other de-
fendants sentenced in error, the loss of chance may itself be a significant harm.
KATE HUDDLESTON
ioo. Cf. Russell, supra note 22, at 90 (describing how the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 arose
from concerns about indeterminate sentencing). But see Jed S. Rakoff, Why the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines Should Be Scrapped, 28 CRIM. JUST. 26 (2014).
1o. See, e.g., Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 96, at 1681.
1o2. See, e.g., Hofer, supra note 92, at 676.
13. See supra notes 63-65 and 76-81 and accompanying text.
io4. But cf. Hawkins v. United States, 7o6 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2013) (labeling an error in
Guidelines interpretation as "less serious" now that the Guidelines are advisory).
105. Cf. Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824.
1o6. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
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tentive editing. I also thank the participants in the Yale Law Journal Student Scholarship
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drafts.
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